




The Ethics of Automated Vehicles: Why Self‑driving Cars 
Should not Swerve in Dilemma Cases
Rob Lawlor1 
Accepted: 28 May 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue that automated vehicles should not swerve to avoid a per-
son or vehicle in its path, unless they can do so without imposing risks onto others. I 
will argue that this is the conclusion that we should reach even if we start by assum-
ing that we should divert the trolley in the standard trolley case (in which the trolley 
will hit and kill five people on the track, unless it is diverted onto a different track, 
where it will hit and kill just one person). In defence of this claim, I appeal to the 
distribution of moral and legal responsibilities, highlighting the importance of safe 
spaces, and arguing in favour of constraints on what can be done to minimise casual-
ties. My arguments draw on the methodology associated with the trolley problem. 
As such, this paper also defends this methodology, highlighting a number of ways 
in which authors misunderstand and misrepresent the trolley problem. For example, 
the ‘trolley problem’ is not the ‘name given by philosophers to classic examples of 
unavoidable crash scenarios, historically involving runaway trolleys’, as Millar sug-
gests, and trolley cases should not be compared with ‘model building in the (social) 
sciences’, as Gogoll and Müller suggest. Trolley cases have more in common with 
lab experiments than model building, and the problem referred to in the trolley 
problem is not the problem of deciding what to do in any one case. Rather, it refers 
to the problem of explaining what appear to be conflicting intuitions when we con-
sider two cases together. The problem, for example, could be: how do we justify the 
claim that automated vehicles should not swerve even if we accept the claim that we 
should divert the trolley in an apparently similar trolley case?
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Most authors who appeal to the trolley problem when discussing automated vehi-
cles appeal to something like Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Bystander at the Switch case 
(Thomson 1985, p. 1397), which I will call Switch:1
Switch
A trolley is heading towards five individuals on the track. The driver tried the 
brakes, but the brakes failed, and the driver fainted. You have seen this, and 
also seen that the trolley can be diverted onto another track, where there is 
only one individual. The switch is within reach. What do you do?
The expectation, typically, seems to be that finding the right answer to this question 
will take us a long way—if not all the way—to deciding what automated vehicles 
should do in similar cases.
In contrast to this approach, I will argue that automated vehicles should be pro-
grammed such that they do not swerve off course to avoid the person/vehicle in its 
path2 in dilemma cases where swerving would put other humans at risk.3 And I will 
argue that we should accept this conclusion even if we think that we should divert 
the trolley in Switch. But this is not because I consider the trolley problem to be 
irrelevant or unimportant. On the contrary, many of my arguments rely on the meth-
odology associated with the trolley problem.
Before presenting the argument, I should acknowledge my assumptions and 
provide some clarifications. For the purpose of this paper, I will be assuming that 
the vehicles are fully automated. Therefore, I will not consider the further issue of 
whether, when or how the vehicle should pass control back to the human driver.4 
Furthermore, on this assumption, this means there will be no human driver in the 
automated vehicles. Anyone who is in the vehicle will be considered a passenger, 
without any responsibilities for the car’s behaviour.5
1 Thomson’s case was, itself, a modification of a case originally presented by Philippa Foot (Foot 1967). 
See (Woollard and Howard-Snyder 2016) for a discussion of the history, and the differences between 
Foot’s original case and Thomson’s.
2 Note that I said ‘in its path’, and not ‘in front of it’. The phrase ‘in its path’ is importantly different 
from ‘in front of it’: essentially the idea is that, if the road is curved, rather than straight, the vehicle 
would continue following the curve of the road, staying in its lane.
3 Obviously, on my view, the vehicle should swerve if it can do so without hitting anyone else. Other 
nuances will be considered throughout the paper.
4 Besides, empirical evidence about the time that a human driver would need in order to resume control 
suggests that passing control to a human driver is unlikely to be a viable option in these dilemma cases 
(Merat et al. 2014; Allan 2018). It is also worth noting that, in Germany’s guidelines for the motor indus-
try, the guidance is that if the human driver fails to act, ‘the vehicle simply tries to stop’ (Tuffley 2017). 
This is very much in keeping with the approach I will be defending in this paper.
5 I do acknowledge that there are further complications if we consider cases in which there is always a 
driver who retains responsibility, in the way that is comparable to a pilot in a plane with autopilot. And I 
do not dismiss these complications. However, there is a limit to what can be addressed in a single paper. 
In this paper, therefore, I will not consider these complications.
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Also, for clarity, I should state that, in my examples, the cars are driving on UK 
roads—and therefore are driving on the left-hand side of the road. And, in all of my 
examples, I am assuming that automated vehicles share the roads with conventional 
cars, as well as bicycles, motorbikes and pedestrians.
Also, I embrace the (usually derogatory) term trolleyology. I do this, primarily, 
because the feature that is typically the focus of derision is in fact a crucial part of 
the methodology that I will defend. Recognising, and highlighting, this feature is an 
important part of highlighting the ways in which many critics misunderstand and 
misrepresent the methodology. The second reason is because using the term ‘trol-
leyology’ allows me to avoid the more cumbersome phrase, ‘the trolley problem and 
the methodology associated with the trolley problem’.
Against Swerving
For the purposes of this paper, I will not defend any particular position in relation 
to Switch. Rather, I will assume (for the sake of argument) that the reader believes it 
would be permissible to divert the trolley. My claim will be that, even if you believe 
it would be permissible to divert the trolley in the Switch case, there is good reason 
to resist the (apparently) similar conclusion in the context of automated vehicles on 
our roads: automated vehicles should not swerve in these dilemma cases in which 
human casualties are unavoidable.
(If you do not think it is permissible to divert the trolley in the case above, this 
will not undermine my argument. On the contrary, this makes my position easier to 
defend, as you will be less resistant to my position to start with.)
So why shouldn’t automated vehicles swerve? To answer this question, I will 
consider a number of dilemma cases involving automated vehicles, and I will high-
light ways in which these cases differ from the Switch case. And, ultimately, I will 
appeal to these differences to justify the claim that we should not programme cars 
to swerve in dilemma cases, even if we assume that we should divert the trolley in 
Switch. Consider the following case:
Follow the Leader
In this case, there are seven adults waiting to cross the road. The first person 
looks, and sees a car coming. Nevertheless, she believes she has time to get 
across the road, and she starts to run across the road. Seeing their friend go to 
cross the road, five of the others run into the road as well, following behind the 
first person. One individual however decides that it doesn’t look safe, and this 
individual waits on the pavement.
Now there is one extra crucial detail. The first person did judge the situation 
correctly: by running across the road, she was able to get to the middle of the 
road. As such, while she would not be on the pavement, safely off the road, 
she would be out of the on-coming car’s lane, and therefore out of harm’s way. 
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(She had looked both ways and had seen that there were no cars coming the 
other way.)
However, because the others left the pavement a little later, and because they 
didn’t run as fast, they did not manage to get out of the car’s way in time. They 
will still be in that car’s lane.
The car is approaching and will not have time to stop. The car (I stipulate) has 
three choices:
1. Try to stop, but don’t swerve—hitting the five who followed their friend
2.  Swerve right onto other side of the road (while also trying to slow down)—hit-
ting the one who crossed first.
3.  Swerve left onto the pavement (while also trying to slow down)—hitting the 
one who stayed on the pavement.
What should we say about this case? The first thing to note is that option 3 looks 
particularly unattractive. The debate that most people will have here will be about 
the choice between 1 and 2. Before we get to the debate between options 1 and 2 
though, we should reflect on this observation. This observation is important because 
our strong intuition about option 3 here may highlight a moral consideration that is 
also relevant in other cases. If we were committed to the simple principle that our 
aim should be to minimise casualties, option 3 should be no worse than option 2. 
But that seems implausible. So, we have to ask: what explains the difference?
Compare Follow the Leader with the following case:
Three Way Switch
This case is like the original Switch case, except there are three tracks, and 
seven people. On its current course, the trolley will hit and kill five people. If 
you divert the trolley right, the trolley will hit and kill one person. If you divert 
the trolley left, the trolley will hit and kill one other person.
Presumably, if you think it is permissible to divert the trolley in Switch, you will 
think it will be permissible to divert the trolley in Three Way Switch. The only dif-
ference is that you now have to consider the question, how should you decide which 
way to divert it?6 But, essentially, if you think diverting the trolley in Switch is per-
missible, there is no obvious reason why you should not divert the trolley left in 
Three Way Switch.
So how do we explain the fact that we think the car should not swerve left, onto 
the pavement, in Follow the Leader? Ultimately, I suggest that the answer is in the 
question: that person is on the pavement! Before discussing this in more detail, how-
ever, it is worth noting that there could be more than one explanation—it could be 
6 Perhaps you should toss a coin. But I will not consider that complication, though I do discuss the value 
of tossing a coin in dilemma cases in (Lawlor 2006) and (Lang and Lawlor 2016).
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overdetermined. Here, though, I will focus on one particular explanation, which has 
two virtues: first, its simplicity, and second its uncontroversial nature, at least in rela-
tion to swerving onto the pavement in this case. This example highlights the fact that 
we may not want to apply the conclusion we reach in the trolley case to automated 
vehicles. But, as I will argue in later, the fact that there are differences, and that we 
do not apply the answer we get in the trolley case to cases involving automated vehi-
cles, does not undermine the trolley problem or the associated methodology.
So why shouldn’t the automated vehicle swerve left, onto the pavement? As noted 
above, I suggest that we appeal to the simple fact that the person is on the pavement. 
That is, independent of any difficult questions about the individuals’ responsibility 
for putting themselves in harm’s way, it is a morally relevant consideration that this 
person is on the pavement while the other six individuals are on the road. It is part 
of our Highway Code that cars should not drive on the pavement. The pavement is a 
protected area. Of course, it is also true that cars should not drive on the wrong side 
of the road—but that norm is weaker than the norm that cars should not drive on 
the pavement (especially at speed). Cars can, in many circumstances, move onto the 
other side of the road. In many cases, this is permissible in overtaking, or manoeu-
vring around obstacles, such as road works or a parked lorry. In contrast, there is a 
much stronger norm against driving up onto the pavement—especially when travel-
ling at speed. Essentially, I argue that certain areas can and should be thought of 
as safe spaces. The pavement, pedestrian crossings and traffic islands seem to be 
the most obvious candidates. My suggestion is that this basic principle should have 
very significant weight: certain designated safe spaces should be protected, such that 
they remain safe, even in these dilemma cases, even if a car could save more lives 
by swerving into a single pedestrian on the pavement. And this principle explains 
why the intuitions we have about what ought to be done in Follow the Leader do not 
match the intuitions we have in relation to Three Way Switch.
Safe Spaces and Responsibility
Above, I introduced the Follow the Leader case and appealed to the idea of safe 
spaces to explain the conclusion that the car should not swerve left onto the pave-
ment. I noted at the time, however, that an appeal to safe spaces was not the only 
explanation one could appeal to.
Another plausible explanation is that the six have acted recklessly and, to some 
extent, were responsible for putting themselves in danger, while the last person 
made a decision to stay safe and to not run across the road. This is a consideration 
that did not feature in Three Way Switch. Therefore, we could appeal to this as a 
consideration that explains why the car should not swerve left, even though we do 
think it would be permissible to divert the trolley to the left. We might think that this 
is a significant consideration that ought to be given some weight at least. In isola-
tion, this seems right to me. However, there are also complications which suggest 




In particular, there are practical concerns. Who should be considered responsible 
for their actions? For example, would we claim that the individuals should be con-
sidered responsible for putting themselves in harm’s way, even if it was six young 
children running across the road, rather than adults? And if we wanted to draw this 
distinction, we would have to consider the fact that an automated vehicle is not likely 
to be able to accurately judge the ages of the individuals in front of it. Also, whether 
the individuals are adults or children, it is unlikely that the vehicles will be able to 
judge whether the individuals are responsible for putting themselves in danger or 
not. Consider the following case:
Freak Wind7
A car is driving in a built-up area, and there are a number of pedestrians on 
the pavement. It is an exceptionally windy day, and an unusually high wind 
blows two pedestrians into the road, into the path of the automated vehicle. A 
third pedestrian also struggles to stay on her feet, but she manages to stay on 
the pavement. There are also cars driving in the opposite direction in the other 
lane of the road. The car has the following three options:
1. Brake, but hit the two pedestrians who have been blown onto the road.
2. Swerve left, hitting the pedestrian on the pavement.
3. Serve right into oncoming traffic.
I do not want to say too much about this case, but I include it in order to present a 
case in which responsibility does not look like it could be the deciding factor.
Even in this case, even though we cannot suggest that the two people in the road 
are responsible for putting themselves at risk, I will argue that there should be a 
strong presumption against driving onto the pavement. In any case in which driving 
onto the pavement would impose a risk of harm onto someone who is on the pave-
ment, there should be a very weighty consideration against doing so, and this is the 
case even if those in the road are not responsible for being there.
This is partly for reasons I discussed in the previous section, in relation to safe 
spaces, but we also need to consider the practical limits. Presumably, it will be very 
difficult to program a computer to be able to distinguish between a person stepping 
into the road voluntarily, a person being blown into the road by a strong wind or a 
person being pushed into the road by a psychopath. These practical considerations 
give us another reason to avoid approaches that would rely heavily on a system’s 
ability to judge who is, and who is not, responsible for being in the road and in dan-
ger of being hit. (Also see the Pillion Passenger case, which I discuss below.)
These complications, I believe, count in favour of the simpler solution presented 
above.
7 If you think these examples sound too far-fetched to be taken seriously, see (Sky News 2015), (Watts 
2015) and (Shaw 2015).
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Back to options 1 and 2
However, we have not yet considered the main issue, which is the choice between 
options 1 and 2:
1. Try to stop, but don’t swerve—hitting the five who followed their friend
2.  Swerve right onto other side of the road (while also trying to slow down)—hit-
ting the one who crossed first.
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that this is a case involving adults, as origi-
nally stipulated.
For many, I suspect it will be tempting to defend option 2 on the grounds that this 
would minimise casualties.8 However, I will argue that we should reject this line of 
reasoning. To support my argument, I could appeal to the two principles considered 
above: one concerning responsibility and the other concerning safe areas. Remem-
ber, it could be overdetermined, so both accounts could be right. Again, however, I 
will ultimately defend the appeal to safe spaces. Nevertheless, it will be illuminating 
to discuss the ethical issues relating to responsibility.
If we focus on responsibility, we should not forget that the first individual did 
make an accurate judgement and did get out of the way of oncoming traffic and, 
while she may not have reached the pavement, she did get out of the way of the 
oncoming traffic, safely to the other side of the road (and remember there were no 
cars on that side of the road). Therefore, we should not treat the six individuals as 
individuals who made the same decision—each running into the road and putting 
themselves in danger. Rather, the first individual made a better judgement than the 
other five. She saw that there were no cars coming from one direction, and—regard-
ing the car coming from the other direction—she judged, correctly, that she had time 
to make it safely to the middle of the road and could then make her way safely to the 
other side of the road. It may have been a risky decision, and we might criticise her 
for crossing the road in such a risky manner, but ultimately her judgement was better 
than the others’ and she was able to get out of harm’s way before the car reached her. 
The other five, in contrast, misjudged the situation, and they put themselves directly 
in harm’s way. Furthermore, their actions put others at risk (at least, this is true if 
cars are likely to swerve).
Given the facts of the case (as I have stipulated them), why should the car swerve 
to avoid those who put themselves in harm’s way, swerving instead into the one per-
son who had judged the risk accurately and had got to the other side of the road? If 
we program automated vehicles to swerve in cases like this, then we effectively give 
people the power to put others at risk. The first adult running across the road made 
a decision and she would have been fine if no one followed her. But if the others 




follow, and if cars are programed to swerve to minimise casualties, the five follow-
ing effectively get the first person killed.9
Considering this case in isolation, and ignoring the practicalities about what auto-
mated vehicles can be expected to consider, this explanation appealing to respon-
sibility seems plausible. In relation to more general principles that can be applied 
to automated vehicles, however, I will resist this explanation, partly because of the 
practicalities noted above, and partly for reasons I will discuss in relation to the next 
case, Pillion Passenger.
Again, I suggest that we should appeal to the importance of safe areas. An obvi-
ous challenge here, though, is that the road does not look as credible a safe space as 
the pavement. My response is to argue that we must also consider context, and moral 
and legal responsibilities.
Consider this in terms of your own behaviour crossing the road. If the other side 
of the road is clear, one does not necessarily wonder, ‘can I get to the pavement 
before the oncoming car reaches me’. One may simply consider whether it is pos-
sible to get past this one lane, to get out of the car’s way (assuming the other side of 
the road is clear). My suggestion, therefore, is that a person should be considered to 
be in a safe space just as long as they are not somewhere they should not be.10 The 
person on the pavement is clearly not somewhere they should not be. Although it 
is more controversial, I have argued that the first runner is also not somewhere she 
should not be. In contrast, the five are very clearly somewhere they should not be.
Safe Spaces and the Distribution of Responsibilities
Again, the benefit of this approach is that we can avoid the complications discussed 
in section ‘Safe Spaces and Responsibility’. In addition, I will now present another 
case, which cannot be dealt with by asking who is responsible for putting themselves 
in danger.
Pillion Passenger
In this case, a car is approaching a crossroads with traffic lights. The car is 
travelling at 30  mph (the speed limit on the road). Next to the car, there is 
a cyclist in the cycle lane, also travelling (downhill) at 30 mph. Before they 
reach the point at which they would need to slow down for the junction, the 
traffic light changes from red to green. Therefore, both the cyclist and the car 
continue, confident that they will pass through the junction before the lights 
10 This may mean that, in some cases, we will reach different conclusions in different countries, as a 
result of different laws having different implications for where people should be. To the extent that there 
can be reasonable disagreements and reasonable differences between legal systems, I do not consider this 
to be an implausible implication of my view.
9 And note, this is a consideration that was not relevant in the Switch case. As such, it is a consideration 
we can appeal to, to explain why automated vehicles should not swerve, even if the trolley should be 
diverted in Switch.
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change back to red. And this, I stipulate, is a reasonable and accurate assess-
ment. As such, this should be unproblematic.
However, just as they come to the junction, a motorcyclist with a passenger 
jumps a red light. Due to the details—the speed, direction and position of the 
vehicles—the car has three choices:
1. Try to stop, but don’t swerve—hitting the back of the motorbike
2. Swerve left—avoiding the motorbike, but hitting the cyclist in the cycling lane.
3.  Swerve right—still hitting the motorbike, as well as driving into the path of 
oncoming traffic.
I assume that we can rule out option 3. But what should we say about the other two 
options? How does this case compare with Follow the Leader or Switch? And what 
lessons can we draw from this case?
One thing to emphasise is that there is a reason I gave the motorcyclist a passen-
ger. And it was not just so that there would be a dilemma between hitting two people 
or hitting one. The other relevant point is that the motorcyclist is responsible for put-
ting herself in harm’s way by jumping a red light—but the passenger is not. So how 
should we deal with this case?
Earlier, I discussed the issue of responsibility, asking whether we should give less 
weight to the lives of those who were responsible for putting themselves in danger. 
In this section, however, I consider a different sense of responsibility. Here, I talk 
about responsibility in the sense of particular individuals having particular responsi-
bilities. For example, as a parent, it is my responsibility to feed my children—it is not 
your responsibility (at least in normal circumstances).
In this section of the paper, I will argue that this sense of responsibility is an 
important element in thinking about the ethics of automated vehicles in dilemma 
cases. We need to think in terms of whose responsibility it is to avoid particular 
harms. In this case, we need to consider the motorcyclist’s responsibilities and the 
driver’s responsibilities—or, in the case of automated vehicles, the car’s respon-
sibilities.11 In particular: it is the motorcyclist’s responsibility to avoid putting her 
passenger in danger. Of course, other drivers should also consider the safety of the 
motorcyclist and her passenger—and should be vigilant for motorbikes. But it is not 
the driver’s responsibility—or the car’s responsibility—to save the pillion passenger 
at the expense of the cyclist when the motorcyclist drives through a red light.12 In 
contrast, it is the car’s responsibility to ensure that it does not put the cyclist at risk 
by swerving into the cycle lane.
11 I am not implying the car has true agency. This should simply be read as shorthand. Also, I am sug-
gesting that the car should be programed such that it follows the law in the same way that a human driver 
should. As such, even if only as a shorthand, it does make sense to talk of the responsibilities that the car 
has in different situations (e.g. it has a responsibility to stick to the speed limit). The programers should 
then program the cars with these responsibilities in mind.
12 Obviously, I agree that it should stop, if possible. And, likewise, it should swerve if it can do so with-
out putting anyone at risk.
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Some might challenge this, asking if I would be committed to the idea that the 
car should not brake hard to avoid the motorbike because doing so would impose 
additional risks on those behind the car. My response to this would be to appeal to 
responsibility again, and also to the law, appealing to the principle that it is every 
driver’s responsibility to leave ample space between themselves and the car in front, 
precisely because the car in the front may need to brake suddenly in an emergency.
It is also worth noting that I am not just appealing to the law as a brute fact, say-
ing that our choices are limited by what would be legally permissible. And I am not 
defending the crude view that we can ignore ethics, and just follow the law.13 Rather, 
I am appealing to particular legal responsibilities, suggesting that these are good 
laws, and that we have good reason to support laws which distribute responsibilities 
in this way.
Is the car itself a safe space?
Another issue that some have discussed in relation to the ethics of automated vehi-
cles is the question of whether it is legitimate to put the safety of the person in the 
car ahead of the safety of other road users—with the added dimension that there is 
obviously an incentive for car manufacturers to put the owner’s safety ahead of other 
people’s, unless legislation takes this choice away.14
Mountain Side
A car, with one passenger, is driving on a narrow, winding mountain road. To 
the left of the car, there is a pedestrian area, with six pedestrians. To the right, 
there is a small verge (just wide enough for pedestrians to stand) and then the 
cliff edge. There is no barrier. Suddenly, five of the six pedestrians run across 
the road from the pavement towards the verge. The car has three options.
1. Try to stop, but don’t swerve—killing the five
2. Swerve left (while trying to stop)—killing a pedestrian on the pavement
3. Swerve right (while trying to stop)—driving off the side of the cliff, killing the 
person in the car.
Considered in isolation (i.e. not in the context of this paper), the natural ques-
tion would be, do we prioritise pedestrians, or do we prioritise those in the car? Or, 
as Millar puts it, ‘Should your robot driver kill you to save a child’s life?’ (Millar 
2014b). But given the context of this paper, and the view that I have defended thus 
far, it is natural to ask a more specific question: is the car itself a safe space, for those 
13 In places, this does seem to be the view defended by Casey (Casey 2017). At other times, however, he 
does seem to recognise the distinction between good laws and bad laws. (I discuss Casey in more detail 
in (Lawlor 2021.)
14 For example, see (Gogoll and Müller 2016).
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inside it? I will argue that the answer to this question is yes, and therefore that the 
‘robot driver’ should not kill you (the passenger of the car) to save a pedestrian.15
This is a self-driving car, so presumably it is driving legally: it is not speeding or 
driving recklessly. It is not doing anything it should not. And you are simply a pas-
senger. As such, you are not doing anything you should not—and you are not some-
where you should not be. As such, appealing to the arguments I have presented so 
far, I suggest that your life should not be sacrificed because someone else—whether 
through their own risky behaviour or by accident—has left a safe space. Therefore, I 
suggest that there is a strong case for saying that the car itself should be considered 
a safe space.
Safe Spaces as Constraints
At this point, I should clarify my position regarding safe spaces. They are not safe 
spaces in the sense that we must do everything we can to protect them and keep 
them safe. That is, I am not arguing that we should make safe spaces as safe as pos-
sible. Rather, they are safe spaces in the sense that their designation as safe spaces 
imposes limits on what it is permissible for vehicles to do in order to minimise casu-
alties. That is, I am appealing to the idea of safe spaces as constraints.
If you are in a safe space, the law protects you in the sense that it makes it clear 
that it would be unlawful for a vehicle to drive into a safe space (unless this can be 
done without imposing a risk on anyone else). This is clear and significant protec-
tion (warranting the label ‘safe space’) even if it cannot guarantee that you will not 
be hit by malfunctioning cars or drunk drivers. This is a form of protection that is 
consistent with other protections we find in the law.
To see why this is significant, consider the following case:
Blocking
In this case, an automated vehicle notices that another car has veered out of 
its lane and is now heading towards the pavement and is likely to hit and kill a 
couple of pedestrians. The car also calculates that if it accelerates and changes 
course slightly, it will intercept and collide with the stray vehicle, thus block-
ing the car’s trajectory towards the pedestrians, saving their lives, but putting 
the passenger of the automated car in danger—possibly risking serious injury, 
and even a possibility of death.
On my interpretation of safe spaces, the automated vehicles should not intercept and 
block the stray vehicle. As I argued above, the car itself should be considered a safe 
space, and—regarding the pavement—the aim is not to make the safe space as safe 
as possible.
15 I should also note that I agree with (Gogoll and Müller 2016) that there is also a problem with leaving 
this particular issue to personal choice, and ultimately to the market.
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Even with these cases in mind, however, the law does offer some protection for 
those on the pavement, in the form of a deterrent, making it clear that whoever is 
responsible will be held legally responsible and will be prosecuted if appropriate 
(whether this is a negligent company or a negligent or reckless human driver).
Safe Spaces and Probabilities
A common complaint against the trolley problem is that, in the standard trolley 
cases, it is assumed that we know the outcomes that will follow from each decision. 
There is no uncertainty. Discussing a case in which a car could swerve to avoid an 
oncoming truck, Nyholm and Smids suggest that:
To many people, imposing a 1% chance of death on an innocent pedestrian in 
order to save five car-passengers might appear to be the morally right choice. 
(Nyholm and Smids 2016, p. 1286)
They then assert:
The trolley cases do not require any such judgments. (Nyholm and Smids 
2016, p. 1286)
But which trolley cases do not require any such judgements? Trolleyology is all 
about creating new cases—creating cases to explore the particular variable that we 
are interested in. Consider the following case, which is in fact based largely on a 
case introduced by Nyholm and Smids themselves.
Truck
A heavy truck suddenly appears in the path of a self-driving car carrying five 
passengers, and the only way for the self-driving car to avoid the truck is to 
swerve, with the possibility of hitting a pedestrian on the sidewalk.16 For var-
ious reasons, there will be significant uncertainty. Ultimately though, I will 
assume that the automated vehicle will be programed to make certain assump-
tions or judgements, and ultimately (whether accurately or not) it will reach 
some sort of conclusion about probabilities. So let us suppose that the system 
runs the calculations, resulting in the following judgements.
1. Do not swerve: 90% chance of a collision. If there is a collision, each of 
the individuals in the car has a 40% chance of being killed.
16 Astute readers may have noticed that I removed the reference to the pedestrian being elderly. Follow-
ing the standard methods of trolleyology, I want to remove variables where possible, to isolate the one 
ethical issue we want to explore. Of course, if we want to discuss ageism we could construct two cases 
that are identical except that one case involves a 20-year-old who will be killed and another case with an 
80-year-old who will be killed, and we can consider whether that should change our judgements in the 
two cases. My view—though I will not defend it here—is that we should not program automated vehicles 
to discriminate in this way, based on age (or race, or status or likelihood of curing cancer…).
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2. Swerve: 10% chance of hitting the pedestrian. If the pedestrian is hit, there 
is a 10% chance of the pedestrian being killed. (So, ultimately, the prob-
ability of the pedestrian being killed is judged to be 1%.)
(And the person in the truck is unlikely to be seriously injured either way.)
Finally, we should remember that we do not know how accurate these prob-
abilities are. These are not likely to be the actual probabilities. These are just 
the results of the system’s calculations, based on limited information and cer-
tain assumptions. Nevertheless, these probabilities are the best we have.
If we just ask people for their initial intuitions, without significant reflection or argu-
ment, and without appealing to the importance of safe spaces and individual respon-
sibilities, I suspect that the majority of people would say that we should program the 
vehicle to swerve.
However, there is an important point to make here. Although trolley cases have 
been adopted by psychologists, who do surveys asking respondents what they would 
do, the methodology I am defending here is the methodology of moral philosophers, 
not psychologists.17 And the thing to emphasise here is that, for moral philosophers, 
any particular case (or pair of cases) is the starting point not the end point. What 
follows from this starting point is argument: argument about what it would be per-
missible to do, and argument about what explains the permissibility of one choice 
and the impermissibility of the other. Ultimately, the aim is to construct a plausible 
set of moral principles which can explain what we should do in each case, and why, 
without contradicting ourselves. Therefore, we should explore the issue and argue 
for different solutions.
I will now argue against the option of swerving, even in this case. On the face of 
it, we have a clash of moral considerations. The probability of harm is clearly a mor-
ally relevant consideration. As the probability of hitting/killing the pedestrian goes 
down, the more tempting it becomes to suggest that the car should swerve. The like-
lihood of harm is clearly a relevant consideration. At the same time, however, I have 
argued in favour of constraints, which would seem to rule out—or, at least, provide a 
strong case against—the option of swerving. The question then is, how weighty are 
the considerations relating to the probabilities involved, and how do they compare to 
the principles I have appealed to so far, regarding responsibilities and safe spaces? 
Are the constraints I have argued for absolute, or could they be outweighed in some 
cases?
I suggest that we should give priority to the protection of those in safe spaces, and 
that we should not consider it permissible to impose risks on some to save others, 
unless the risk is negligible. That is, the car should not swerve if this would impose 
a non-negligible risk on the pedestrian on the pavement. Of course, this raises a new 
17 For an interesting contrast between the approach of philosophers and the approach of psychologists, 
see (Kamm 2008, pp. 422–449). And for arguments highlighting the value of the empirical study of trol-
ley dilemmas, using surveys to explore people’s views, see (Wolkenstein 2018). I have no objection to 




difficulty. What counts as non-negligible? That is not a question I will answer here. 
I will say, however, that 1% is far from non-negligible. Even a ‘mere’ 1% chance of 
being killed is a very significant probability of death. I suggest that a negligible risk 
of death is very significantly less than 1%.
Now, let us compare and contrast two cases in order to consider the difference 
that a single change makes. I will start with another case from Thomson.
Transplant
A surgeon has 5 patients who will die imminently if they do not receive organ 
transplants. Coincidentally, ‘a young man who has just come into [the] clinic 
for his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type’ (Thomson 1985, p. 
1396). The surgeon realises that if he took all the organs from this young man 
he could provide organs to her other patients—saving the lives of five patients, 
at the cost of a single life.
Transplant 1%
This case is similar to the previous case. In this case, however, the surgeon 
does not need to take the young man’s organs in order to save the lives of the 
five. Rather, he would only need to perform a procedure which, although not 
exactly safe, would be unlikely to kill the patient. More specifically, the doctor 
estimates, there is a 10% chance of injuring the young man in a particular way. 
And, if he is injured in this way, there is a 10% chance that he will die. (So, 
ultimately, the probability of the young man being killed is judged to be 1%.)18
I take it as a given that it would be impermissible to harvest the patient’s organs in 
order to save five lives in the first case. And I have already acknowledged that the 
probability of harm is a morally relevant consideration—and a significant one. But 
how significant is it? In this case, I suggest that the reduced probability of death is 
not sufficient to outweigh the other considerations that count against imposing this 
risk on the young man, without his consent, to save the five. I take this to be rela-
tively uncontroversial—and if we appeal to the law and codes of ethics in medical 
practice, the answer is very clear: it would be impermissible.
While I acknowledge that there are also differences between Transplant 1% and 
Truck 1% which could warrant further discussion, here I will just emphasise two 
points:
(1) My argument here is based primarily on the comparison between Transplant 
and Transplant 1%. My point is that the moral considerations that count against 
sacrificing one to save five in a case of certainty remain significant even when 
the harm is far from certain. This principle can be applied, straightforwardly, to 
cases involving automated vehicles.
18 Note the similarity of the probabilities of the outcomes for the pedestrian in Truck.
1 3
The Ethics of Automated Vehicles: Why Self-driving Cars Should…
(2) Although I concede that there are differences between the Transplant cases and 
the Truck cases, the similarities are significant enough to shift the burden to my 
opponent, such that it is up to them to argue that the differences are significant 
enough, such that we can justify imposing risks onto the one to save the five in 
Truck 1%, even if we can’t justify this in Transplant 1%.
Objections
In this section of the paper, I will respond to two possible objections to this paper—
one relating to the methodology of the paper, and one relating to the conclusion I 
defend.
Objections to the use of the Trolley Problem
In my attempt to defend my position, I have appealed to the trolley problem and 
made use of the methodology associated with the trolley problem. However, many 
have argued that the trolley problem has little or no value when considering the eth-
ics of automated vehicles. In this paper, I will focus primarily on (Gogoll and Müller 
2016) and (Nyholm and Smids 2016), but a number of other papers, with similar 
objections, will also be discussed in passing.
I will respond to these objections, highlighting ways in which many authors 
have misunderstood the trolley problem, particularly in the literature on automated 
vehicles.
To a large extent, much of this work has been done for me in a couple of excellent 
papers (Keeling 2020) (Hübner and White 2018). However, I will argue that there 
are some significant flaws which were not exposed explicitly enough in these papers. 
I suggest that these arguments are important if we are to fully appreciate the weak-
ness of the arguments against the trolley problem, and if we are to fully understand 
the value of trolleyology.
The Trolley Problem is not the Name of a Dilemma Case
First, it is important to note that the ‘trolley problem’ is not the ‘name given by 
philosophers to classic examples of unavoidable crash scenarios, historically involv-
ing runaway trolleys and innocent bystanders’ (Millar 2014a) or the name given 
to a ‘type of lesser-of-evils dilemma, where injury is both inevitable and variable’ 
(Casey 2017, p. 1353) (Also see (Lin 2015, p. 78) and (Etzioni and Etzioni 2017, p. 
415)).
The term was coined by Thomson, and Thomson is quite explicit in stating what 
the trolley problem refers to. In the following passage, Thomson is contrasting the 
trolley case with Transplant:
Why is it that the bystander may turn his trolley, though the surgeon may not 
remove the young man’s lungs, kidneys, and heart? Since I find it particularly 
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puzzling that the bystander may turn his trolley, I am inclined to call this The 
Trolley Problem. Those who find it particularly puzzling that the surgeon may 
not operate are cordially invited to call it The Transplant Problem instead. 
(Thomson 1985, p. 1401)
The key question is not, ‘what would you do?’ but rather, ‘what explains the 
difference?’19
This highlights another misunderstanding.
Differences are Essential
One of the most common ways in which authors challenge the trolley problem is by 
appealing to what Keeling calls ‘The Moral Difference Argument’, according to which:
Trolley cases and real-world collisions are different in at least some morally 
significant respects; and these differences render trolley cases of little or no 
relevance to the moral design problem. (Keeling 2020)
Keeling highlights a number of significant problems with this objection, and his 
arguments are compelling. However, despite the force of his arguments, Keeling 
understates the extent to which Nyholm and Smids (and others) have missed the 
point. Keeling argues that differences between trolley cases and automated vehicles 
do not render the trolley problem irrelevant. However, he does not emphasise the 
more important point. It is not just that the trolley problem can be relevant, despite 
differences. Rather, the differences are, in fact, an essential element of trolleyol-
ogy. The methodology necessarily involves comparisons between cases, and these 
comparisons are possible only if there are differences between one case and another. 
If you miss this, you completely miss the point of the trolley problem. But this is 
exactly what Nyholm and Smids do (along with Gogoll and Müller and many other 
authors writing about the trolley problem in the context of automated vehicles).
For example, Nyholm and Smids argue that it is problematic that trolley cases 
are so different from cases involving automated vehicles, and they highlight (among 
other differences) differences relating to moral and legal responsibilities.20 (Nyholm 
and Smids 2016, p. 1287) To see why we should not be persuaded by this objec-
tion, consider my arguments in this paper. My arguments explicitly focus on moral 
and legal responsibilities, and the arguments are based on the very differences that 
Nyholm and Smids worry about. The differences that Nyholm and Smids worry 
about do not cause problems for me. They are an essential part of my argument. I 
20 Bryan Casey also has a paper focusing on the importance of legal responsibility when criticising 
approaches that use abstract cases like trolley cases (Casey 2017). Casey complains that a focus on ethics 
essentially misses the point, and he argues that companies and their engineers will just focus on the law: 
‘Lawyers have got this one’, he asserts in the abstract. Similarly, see (Marshall 2017). Even if we accept 
Casey’s argument (which I do not), Casey’s argument only shows that engineers and businesses need not 
think about trolley cases—but trolley cases, and the arguments in this paper, would remain relevant to 
those trying to work out what the law ought to be. (I discuss Casey in more detail in (Lawlor 2021.)
19 Similarly, note how this question is emphasised by (Woollard and Howard-Snyder 2016), in their sum-
mary of the history of the trolley problem.
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appeal to these differences to explain why, in Follow the Leader, it is not permissible 
for the automated vehicles to swerve left (onto the pavement) even if it is permissi-
ble for the trolley to be diverted left in Three Way Switch.
There are no Limits
Similarly, Nyholm and Smids also emphasise that, in trolley cases, there ‘is only a 
very limited number of considerations that are allowed to be taken into account’. 
They continue, ‘This is not the ethical-decision situation that is faced by the mul-
tiple stakeholders who together need to decide how to program self-driving cars to 
respond to different types of accident-scenarios’ (Nyholm and Smids 2016, p. 1281). 
And they emphasise, ‘they can bring any and all considerations they are able to 
think of as being morally relevant to bear on their decision about how to program 
the cars. They can do that and should do so’ (Nyholm and Smids 2016, p. 1282).
The point they miss, however, is that trolleyology is all about creating new cases. 
It is because there are numerous variations of trolley cases, rather than just a sin-
gle case, that some people refer to this growing literature as trolleyology (Bakewell 
2013) (Brown 2010) (Levy 2014). And there are so many variations because, with 
each new variation, authors aim to highlight new considerations. This is the very 
feature of the methodology that is derided by those who use ‘trolleyology’ as a term 
of derision. Once we recognise this, we can see that the objection is misguided. 
Trolleyologists can discuss ‘any and all considerations’ that they consider to be mor-
ally relevant. One simply needs to construct the appropriate case or cases. The key 
point, though, is that trolleyologists seek precision and clarity by constructing cases 
to exclude other variables, as discussed in the next section.
Lab Experiments, not Model Building
Ultimately, the mistakes considered above are closely related to a more fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of the trolley problem, which suggests that the methodology 
involves something like the following three-stage approach.
First, we start by identifying a trolley case, typically Switch.
Second, we reach a judgement about whether it would be permissible or imper-
missible to divert the trolley in Switch.
Finally, we then apply the conclusion from stage two to cases involving auto-
mated vehicles.
According to this approach, if it is permissible, in Switch, to divert the trolley, 
to minimise the number of people killed, then we should conclude that it would be 
similarly permissible to program cars to swerve when this would reduce the number 
of people killed. This seems to be implicit in many papers which discuss the trolley 
problem in relation to automated vehicles, but it can be seen clearest when authors 
explicitly spell out their understanding of the methodology. For example, Gogoll and 
Müller suggest that trolley cases are like scientific models, intended to capture ‘the 
correct set of variables’ (Gogoll and Müller 2016, p. 690).
They claim that in applied ethics…
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We use thought experiments as proxies for moral problems in the real world. 
Thought experiments in applied ethics are useful only insofar as they manage 
to abstract away distracting details, while retaining the important moral prop-
erties and variables of the initial problem X. If we fail to include an impor-
tant variable of the initial problem in our thought experiment, then the elicited 
intuitions and the corresponding underlying moral principles will not teach us 
anything about how to regulate problem X. Creating a moral thought experi-
ment is then essentially similar to what is called model building in the (social) 
sciences. In creating a model, it is important that we are able to identify the 
relevant variables at work in a certain situation. The tricky part in modeling, 
of course, is identifying the correct set of variables. (Gogoll and Müller 2016, 
p. 690)21
With this ‘model’ analogy, they add a little detail to the three-stage process, such 
that we have an approach that I will call the ‘modelling’ approach.
The Modelling Approach
Step one: we identify a trolley case (or other thought experiment) which cap-
tures ‘the correct set of variables’, which will then function as our ‘model’.
Step two: we work out what the right response would be in our model.
Step three: based on the principle that ‘in applied ethics, we … use thought 
experiments as proxies for moral problems in the real world’ (Gogoll and Mül-
ler 2016, p. 690) we apply the conclusion we reached in step two to the real-
world problem we are considering.
My claim is that this is a mistake. Most thought experiments—and trolley cases in 
particular—should not be understood as being analogous to modelling. For exam-
ple, consider another (now infamous) trolley case from Thomson, which I call 
Footbridge.22
Footbridge
This case is like Switch, in that you can do nothing, and five people will die, or 
you can intervene and only one will die. This time, though, the only way you 
can save the five is by pushing a fat man off a bridge into the path of the trol-
ley. Thomson stipulates that this would kill the person who was pushed into 
the path of the trolley, but it would also be sufficient to stop the trolley. (It is 
also stipulated that, while you could jump in front of the trolley yourself, you 
would not be big enough to stop the trolley.)
21 This quote does not explicitly mention trolley cases. It talks, more generally, about thought experi-
ments. However, this argument is presented in the context of their criticism of trolley cases being unreal-
istic.
22 Thomson calls this case Fat Man (Thomson 1985, p. 1409).
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It would be extremely uncharitable to suggest that Thomson thought that her 
blatantly unrealistic example was intended to mirror the real world—or to act as a 
‘[proxy] for moral problems in the real world’ (Gogoll and Müller 2016, p. 690).
Thought experiments like Thomson’s are not the philosopher’s equivalent of 
models. Rather, they are the philosopher’s equivalent of lab experiments. As such, I 
reject the claim that ‘Thought experiments in applied ethics are useful only insofar 
as they manage to abstract away distracting details, while retaining the important 
moral properties and variables of the initial problem X’ (Gogoll and Müller 2016, 
p. 690). Perhaps some thought experiments can be compared to models, acting as 
proxies for moral problems in the real world, but this is not the case for trolley cases 
like Switch or Footbridge. Like lab experiments, they are not intended to be accu-
rate representations of the world. Like lab experiments, the aim is to isolate a single 
variable, and ideally to keep everything else constant. If one particular feature is 
the only difference between two cases, and if we have different intuitions about the 
two cases, then we can examine that one feature in isolation.23 In both Switch and 
Footbridge, we sacrifice one life but save five. So why is it okay to turn the trolley 
in Switch, but it is not okay to push the man off the bridge in Footbridge? Can we 
identify a moral principle that would allow us to explain the different conclusions 
we reach in each case?
While this approach can result in examples that seem bizarre or comical, we 
should remember that the details are chosen for a reason. And we should remember 
that lab experiments are not intended to be realistic representations of the world. 
The real world is messy and quite different from the lab. And, of course, it is true 
that one should not appeal to the results from lab experiments without being careful 
to consider the complexities that come with the real world (see Goldacre 2009, pp. 
93–97). Despite this, we learn a lot from lab experiments (because of the ability to 
remove variables), and they remain an essential part of science, despite the messi-
ness of the world outside of the lab.
Nyholm and Smids are not as explicit as Gogoll and Müller, but their arguments 
appear to rest on the same mistake. As noted above, they also highlight numerous 
ways in which trolley cases differ from cases involving automated vehicles. This, in 
itself, suggests something like the three-stage approach. At least, it is not clear why 
they would consider the differences to be problematic, unless they have something 
like this three-stage process in mind. The three-stage process also seems to be what 
Nyholm and Smids have in mind when, in the title of their paper, they ask whether 
23 Here, it is worth mentioning why I do not discuss Millar’s ‘Tunnel Case’ (Millar 2014a), which has 
been discussed by others (Hogarth 2016), (Crisp 2015), (Stokes 2014). This case is primarily presented 
as a dilemma between saving the passenger of the car and a pedestrian in the road. In addition, however, 
it also stipulates that the pedestrian is a child, which raises additional issues. Additionally, the child trips, 
which introduces an element of luck, perhaps changing our view on the question of whether the child 
was responsible for putting himself in harm’s way. This is not to say the case has no value. But, for the 
methodology I am defending here, the aim should be (as far as possible) to isolate each issue, to consider 
each in isolation. Similarly, see the truck case in (Nyholm and Smids 2016, p. 1285) and their inclusion 
of the pedestrian’s age, along with the other variables, discussed in footnote 16. (Age is also discussed in 
(Etzioni and Etzioni 2017).)
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accident-algorithms for self-driving cars are an example of ‘an applied trolley prob-
lem?’ (Nyholm and Smids 2016). Similarly, it seems to be what Etzioni and Etzioni 
have in mind when they complain that hard cases make bad laws (Etzioni and Etzi-
oni 2017), and it seems to be what many critics of the trolley problem have in mind 
when they complain that trolley cases are unrealistic, absurd or simply different 
from the real-life ethical issues we are interested in. As such, I suggest that Gogoll 
and Müller are not alone in understanding the trolley problem in this way. However, 
it is noteworthy that it is an interpretation that is only found amongst critics of the 
trolley problem. This is not the interpretation that you find in the papers that actually 
use the trolley problem. If the methodology that the critics criticise is not the same 
as the methodology that trolleyologists actually use, it seems that the critics have 
missed their target. They are attacking an approach that no one actually defends.
So how should we understand the trolley problem. I will call this the ‘contrast 
and explain approach.’ This is the approach that has been used by Foot and Thom-
son, and many others, and it is the approach I used in this paper.
The Contrast and Explain Approach
First, identify (or construct) two cases about which people are likely to have 
different intuitions, reaching different conclusions, despite the fact that the 
cases are largely similar.
Second, ask the question, what explains the difference?
Third, provide an explanation.
In contrast to the modelling approach, this approach relies on the cases being differ-
ent. The differences do not undermine the argument (suggesting that one case is an 
imperfect model for the other). They inform the argument.
As a final note, however, it is worth noting that this approach is not as linear or 
as simple as the three steps above suggest. The method involves a lot of back and 
forth, revising intuitions and explanations as new arguments highlight new implica-
tions and new problems. Similarly, the process is not as insulated as the three steps 
above suggest. As the history of the trolley problem highlights, debates do not typi-
cally stick to the original cases. New cases are introduced, highlighting new morally 
relevant considerations and new challenges. As such, the characterisation presented 
above is a gross simplification. Nevertheless, in the context of this paper, it is suf-
ficient to highlight the extent to which it differs from the model-building interpreta-
tion, and to highlight the fact that differences are an essential part of the methodol-
ogy, rather than flaws that undermine the approach.
The ‘Irrational’ Objection (and the Value of Predictability)
Regardless of the methodological issues discussed above, I suspect that some will 
challenge the conclusion that I have defended, arguing that it is irrational. The key 
point in favour of programing cars to swerve, in any case in which this will save 
more people than it will kill, is that this approach will reduce the number of deaths 
on the roads. Therefore, for each individual considering what rules or principles they 
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would prefer manufacturers to use, it would be rational to want cars to swerve and to 
do whatever is necessary to save as many lives as possible. Statistically, for each of 
us, if we think only of our own self-interest, and if we want to minimise our chances 
of being killed on the roads, we should want car manufacturers to program their cars 
to minimise the number of people killed, and to ignore other details.
I will argue that we should not accept this argument.
First, the empirical assumption can be challenged. Even if it is true, as a statis-
tical average, that this policy would reduce people’s chances of being killed in a 
road accident, it does not follow that the policy would actually be better for every 
individual. Remember, an implication of programming vehicles to swerve, in these 
dilemma cases, is that a pedestrian who is acting responsibly and keeping them-
selves safe, might be sacrificed in order to save the lives of a larger number who 
have put themselves at risk. Consider the Mountain Side case again.
In this case, and in others, there are two important implications of the fact that 
cautious pedestrians might be sacrificed to save reckless pedestrians who have put 
themselves at risk:
First, from an individual’s point of view, programing a car to make decisions 
based on how many people will be killed (or hit), introduces unpredictability. As 
stated above, the reckless behaviour of others can put you at risk. In contrast, an 
approach that emphasises safe spaces introduces a predictability and clarity, which 
gives you more control over your own safety. If you stay on the pavement (where 
possible), and only cross the road at designated pedestrian crossings or only cross 
the road when it is very clearly safe to do so, then you are in a good position to keep 
yourself safe. Of course, I am not suggesting that you would have a 0% chance of 
being killed. There is always the possibility of a reckless driver, for example, los-
ing control and mounting the pavement. Nevertheless, for individuals who are more 
cautious than average, it is plausible to suggest that they would be safer if cars were 
not programed to swerve than they would if cars were programed to swerve to save 
lives, without constriants. And, even if you are not typically cautious, it is in your 
power to be—you can make decisions that will keep you safe.
This also points to the second point. From society’s perspective, the (apparently) 
consequentialist approach could potentially backfire. If my safety depends primarily 
on my own behaviour, this gives me more of an incentive to be cautious. Therefore, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that this incentive could be sufficient to have the 
effect that the roads would be safer if vehicles were not programed to minimise cas-
ualties. Therefore, in contrast to the rest of this paper, this particular argument could 
provide a consequentialist justification for the position I am defending.
Ultimately though, my main arguments will not rely on claims about what the 
actual consequences would be. Rather, I put more weight on the non-consequential-
ist arguments. And this should not be a surprise. Trolley cases have typically been 
used to challenge consequentialism, and to fine-tune non-consequentialist princi-
ples. In particular, arguments in the trolley literature emphasise that consequential-
ism is often more plausible when considered in the abstract, and less plausible when 
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one considers the implications of the theory.24 Cases like Footbridge and Trans-
plant highlight the counter-intuitive implications of consequentialism, challenging 
the principle that we should simply aim to save as many lives as possible, and they 
highlight the moral significance of other considerations (the idea of appealing to 
trolley cases, and the trolley problem, to challenge consequentialism and an—often 
unthinking—commitment to harm minimisation without constraints is also a signifi-
cant part of (Keeling 2020) and (Hübner and White 2018)).
Perhaps most importantly, the argument that my position is irrational relies on 
a problematic understanding of what is rational. We should not accept it. It is not 
irrational to appeal to moral considerations. This is true even if they are contrary 
to one’s self-interest. It is not irrational for me to recognise that it would be mor-
ally wrong to kill one patient, to take his organs, to save the lives of five other indi-
viduals. It is not irrational to think this, even if I am one of the patients whose life 
depends on an organ transplant. Even if it would be against my self-interest, it would 
not be irrational for me to vote against a proposal to make it legal for doctors to kill 
someone when doing so would save more lives overall, by providing organs for life-
saving surgery.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have highlighted a number of flaws in common objections to the 
trolley problem (and other thought experiments), and I have identified and argued 
against a three-stage process, which I call the ‘modelling approach.’ I have argued 
that this approach involves a significant misunderstanding of the trolley problem and 
fails to recognise the real value of the methodology. In contrast, I have defended 
an approach which I call the ‘contrast and explain approach’, and I have used this 
approach to argue that automated vehicles should not be programed to swerve in 
dilemma cases, where there is (for example) a choice between hitting one or hitting 
five. Furthermore, I argue that this is the conclusion that we should reach even if we 
start by assuming that we should divert the trolley in Switch.
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